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Abstract 
An explanation facility is an important component of an expert system, but current systems 
for the most part have neglected the importance of tailoring a system's explanations to the 
user. This paper explores the role of user modelling in generating expert system explanations, 
making the claim that individualized user models are essential to  produce good explanations 
when the system users vary in their knowledge of the domain, or in their goals, plans, and 
preferences. To make this argument, a characterization of explanation, and good explanation is 
made, leading to a presentation of how knowledge about the user affects the various aspects of 
a good explanation. Individualized user models are not only important, it is pratical to obtain 
them. A method for acquiring a model of the user's beliefs implicitly by "eavesdropping" on the 
interaction between user and system is presented, along with examples of how this information 
can be used to tailor an explanation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction 
A distinctive feature of expert systems is the explicit representation of the reasoning and domain 
knowledge they use, enabling them to provide an explanation for the conclusions they reach. Unlike 
other decision systems, where the answer or recommendation is often presented without support, 
expert systems allow the user to  explore the reasoning process that lead to the conclusion. In fact, 
explanation capabilities are frequently the most significant benefit provided by an expert system. 
This paper examines the role of explanation in expert systems, and why user models are im- 
portant to  the generation of good explanations. The thesis is essentially this: when producing an 
explanation, a system makes assumptions about the knowledge of the user; if the system is designed 
to  interact with a range of users whose domain knowledge varies, then explicit user models will be 
necessary, in order to  generate good explanations. Furthermore, it is feasible to acquire such models 
as a user communicates with the system, and the models acquired in this way will be sufficient to 
tailor expert system explanations to  individual users so that they will find the explanations more 
understandable. 
The path taken to  substantiate this thesis is somewhat long, occupying the body of the pa- 
per. First, the importance of an explanation facility for expert systems is discussed in section 2, 
arguing that the essential role of explanation in many expert systems justifies efforts t o  improve 
their explaining capabilities. Unfortunately, our understanding of explanation and the process of 
explaining within the Artificial Intelligence community is primarily intuitive. To provide a more 
solid basis for talking about explanation, material from the Philosophy of Science discussing ex- 
planations and their quality, augmented with a discussion of computational issues, is presented in 
sections 3 and 4. At this point, the need for knowledge about the user in producing good explana- 
tions will be evident. Section 5 considers the points in explanation generation where a user model 
is important, and how knowledge of the user's beliefs about the domain and reasoning knowledge 
of the system can influence explanations produced. 
The role of user models in explanation generation is merely an academic exercise if such models 
cannot be acquired practically. Section 6 summarizes our work on acquiring knowledge of the user's 
beliefs about the system's domain and reasoning knowledge-knowledge used in the explanation 
generation process. These user model acquisition techniques build a user model implicitly, by 
"eavesdropping" on the interaction between system and user. Furthermore, the techniques are 
domain independent, enabling a general user modelling facility that can be used effectively in a 
range of systems with minimal customization. Section 7 illustrates how the acquisition rules acquire 
a model of the user's beliefs from a dialogue between the system and a user, and how these beliefs 
can be used to tailor an explanation so it is more understandable, with an extended example of a 
hypothetical investment advisory system. 
2 The Importance of Explanation 
An important feature of expert systems is their ability to  explain their own reasoning. In summa- 
rizing a survey of physician's expectations and demands for computer-based consultation systems 
(reported in [36]) Buchanan and Shortliffe note: 
. . . a program's ability to  give explanations for its reasoning was judged to be the single 
most important requirement for an advice-giving system in medicine." [5, p. 6031 
Weiner states that knowledge-based systems ". . .include some mechanism for giving explanations, 
since their credibility depends on the user's ability to  follow their reasoning, thereby verifying that 
an answer is correct." [41, p. 191. Explanation is thus a crucial feature of expert systems. 
2 THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLANATION 
2.1 Why Explanation is Important 
An explanation capability is important in an expert system for several reasons. The most common 
reason is the one noted by Weiner above: explanations are needed to justify a recommendation. 
An explanation can increase user acceptance of a recommendation by providing assurance that 
the recommendation is logical, or it can persuade a user that an unexpected recommendation is 
appropriate [39]. 
Explanations also help the user to  recognize the limitations of an expert system. Neches, 
Swartout, and Moore [24, 251 have noted that system recommendations can confuse users who are 
unsure of the scope of system capabilities. An explanation facility enables the user to explore the 
system's reasoning to  determine whether the system considered all the relevant facts, and reasoned 
with them appropriately. 
Explanation can be an important aid to  expert system development and maintenance, by pro- 
viding a history of the reasoning steps taken by the system. MYCIN's explanation facility originated 
in commands to aid in debugging rules [5, p. 331-3321. Neches, Swartout, and Moore [24, 251 have 
exploited the relationship between explainability and maintainability in their Explainable Expert 
Systems (EES) approach, using declarative knowledge representations and an automatic program 
writer to  produce systems that have good explanation facilities and are more maintainable than 
traditional expert systems. 
Finally, an explanation facility can enable an expert system to instruct users about the system's 
domain. The GUIDON project [ll, 101 exploited MYCIN's explanation capabilities to  build an 
intelligent tutoring system for medical diagnosis. Even in conventional expert systems, an expla- 
nation capability may allow the system to provide a user with information he did not know, such 
as defining concepts relevant to  the domain, as the CLEAR system does [31]. 
2.2 How Explanation Can Be Improved 
Research on improving explanation has focused on two approaches: extending the range of pos- 
sible explanations that an expert system can provide, and improving the quality of explanations 
produced. Conventional expert system explanations are limited t o  providing a description of the 
steps the system took in reaching a conclusions. For example, when MYCIN requests a piece of 
information, the user is allowed to  type "WHY?" (interpreted to mean "How is this information 
useful?"), causing the system to produce an explanation based on the rule this goal appears in, and 
the goal the rule concludes about [9]. Such systems are capable of explaining what they did, but 
cannot justify those actions [34]. 
Clancey [9] and Swartout [34] have considered ways to extend the range of explanations an 
expert system can produce. Each has discovered that to  produce explanations that address the 
intentions behind the system's actions, the strategic knowledge used by the system to reason about 
the domain must be separated from definitional and causal knowledge about the domain. 
The second research issue, improving the quality of explanations produced, is the focus of this 
paper. Early work in this area includes the translation of formal proofs into English [8] and Weiner's 
BLAH system [41], which focused on how to organize and focus the information in an explanation. 
Wallis and Shortliffe [39], Sleeman [33], McKeown [21], and Paris [26] have presented methods for 
tailoring explanations according to user knowledge. The common emphasis of this approach is 
a focus on deciding what information an explanation should include, and how that information 
should be presented to benefit the user most. 
3 WHAT IS AN EXPLANATION? 
3 What is an Explanation? 
Since this paper focuses on explanation, and particularly on how to produce quality explanations, 
it is important to  have a firm basis for discussion. Unfortunately, in expert systems research 
explanations are usually considered as simply the response an expert system makes to a "why?" 
question. Such a view is inadequate. Explaining is a type of human communication, one that expert 
systems are intended to  mimic in their responses. Thus, it is important to  characterize explanation 
and the explaining act. This section briefly discusses types of explanations, then presents a formal 
description of explanation and explaining taken from the Philosophy of Science. This analysis 
of explanation will serve as a basis for the following section, where the characteristics of good 
explanations are considered. 
3.1 Types of Explanations 
Explanations can take many forms, depending on the type of information they communicate. Per- 
haps the most familiar type of explanation is scientific explanation, where an argument is given to  
support a specific conclusion. Such arguments make take the form of deductive proofs from certain 
or uncertain premises (labeled deductive-nomologicaI and deductive-statistical explanations respec- 
tively by Hempel [15]). Other types of scientific explanations may argue inductively (inductive- 
statistical explanations), or argue from the relation of a particular theory to  the observed world 
(statistical-relevance explanations) [32]. 
Although the scientific style of explanation is the most obvious type of explanation, there 
are many others as well. Descriptions of objects or processes are often used to explain, such as 
explaining how to send an electronic mail message by describing the sequence of steps required 
to  accomplish the action, or describing a telephone to explain how it works. In other cases, the 
explanation may take the form of an argument, but without the strict reasoning methods of a 
scientific argument, such as arguments that rely on analogy, examples, or an appeal to  an authority. 
Although current expert systems tend to  give scientific-style explanations, any form of expla- 
nation may be appropriate. Since an explanation is used to  communicate information to  the user, 
systems should use the type of explanation that is most likely to  be successful. In some cases, this 
may mean that the use of analogy or example is more appropriate than a complex scientific expla- 
nation. For example, the analogy between water flow and electricity is often used when explaining 
electrical properties. In other cases, the system may need to describe objects or processes in the 
domain, rather than argue about them. Thus, expert system explanations can, and should, take 
on a variety of forms depending on the explaining situation. A good explanation facility must be 
able to  decide which form of explanation is most appropriate for a given situation. 
3.2 Explaining 
Having a typology of explanations is useful for understanding the range of circumstances where 
explanations might appear, and the range of behaviors that might be labeled "explaining." A 
typology is not sufficient, however, to  enable one to  point and say "That is an explanation!," or 
"That can't be an explanation!" Such a capability requires a specification of what conditions 
are necessary and sufficient for identifying an explanation. This section reformulates the issue 
of identifying explanations by first claiming that explanations are products of explaining actions. 
Furthermore, explaining is an illocutionary action [3], hence necessary and sufficient conditions for 
explaining must account for its illocutionary nature. These conditions are presented, along with 
further characteristics of explanation and explaining. 
3 WHAT IS AN EXPLANATION? 
Explana t  ion is t h e  P r o d u c t  of Explaining 
The concept of explanation is closely tied to the phenomenon of understanding, in that explanations 
aid the hearer's understanding of that which is being explained. However, everything that aids 
understanding is not an explanation. Suppose a person observes a billiard game, and by this 
observation comes to understand Newton's laws of motion-the billiard game did not explain 
Newton's laws of motion, rather, it happened to aid in a particular understanding event. On 
the other hand, having the form of an explanation (such as a logical argument form) does not 
make a statement an explanation-it may be wrong or universally misunderstood. Thus, although 
explanation involves understanding, there is more to it-the explanation must be presented us an 
explanation. In other words, an explanation is the result of an explaining action. 
Explaining is an illocutionary action 131, an action performed with a particular intention in mind. 
Other types of illocutionary acts include warning, commanding, or promising.1 To demonstrate 
this, consider a situation where a person, while reading the warning sign "Flammable Liquid: 
No Smoking" comes to  realize that an exposed flame can cause a flammable Liquid to explode. 
Certainly, the warning sign cannot be considered to  explain the fact that exposed flames can cause 
flammable liquids to explode, because the sign was never intended to be an explanation. Thus, not 
only should a statement contribute to understanding to be considered an explanation, it should 
also be produced with the intention that it explain. Hence, explaining actions are illocutionary 
 action^.^ 
Condit ions for Explaining 
Achinstein, in his book "The Nature of Explanation" [I] has presented a formal account of explain- 
ing, explanation, and what it means to be a good explanation, stating three necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a speaker S to explain "why p" to a hearer H by uttering a statement u expressing 
the proposition e.3 
1. Intentionality: S utters u with the intention that H understand "why p." 
2. Correctness: S believes that e is a correct answer to the question "Why p?" 
3. Instrumentality: S utters u with the intention that u will produce the knowledge of "why p" 
in H. 
The intentionality condition captures the illocutionary nature of explaining, while the correctness 
- 
condition specifies that the speaker believes what he say is a correct answer. The instrumentality 
requirement is necessary to ensure that telling the hearer how to acquire the answer to  "Why p?" 
(such as telling him where to look for the answer) does not count as the explanation of "why p." 
It is enlightening to consider two features that are not necessary conditions for an explaining 
- 
act. First, it is not necessary that the hearer recognize the explaining act. For example, H may 
not be listening when S utters u. The act is still the same, whether H realizes it or not, so it seems 
appropriate to omit H7s  realization of the act as a requirement for explaining. Similarly, explaining 
is not a perlocutionary act. If explaining were a perlocutionary act, an additional condition, 
lIllocutionary acts are distinguished from locutionary acts, such as simple utterances, and from perlocutionary 
acts, which include the effects of the action on other agents. Thus commanding someone to stop is an illocutionary 
act. The actual statement "Stop!" is a locutionary act, while causing the person to stop is a perlocutionary act. 
2Another reasonable possibility is to consider explanations to be perlocutionary acts. This issue will be discussed 
in the next section. 
3This definition is taken from [I ,  pp. 16-18], but notation has been significantly changed, and in some cases 
technical aspects of the definition have been omitted. 
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concerning the effect of the explanation on the hearer, would be needed, such as the requirement 
that the hearer understand the explanation. Such a requirement would eliminate the possibility for 
failures when the speaker produces an explanation, but the hearer fails to understand. 
An explanation is simply the product of an explaining act. More precisely, an explanation can 
be represented as an ordered pair consisting of a proposition and an act-type, so an explanation 
answering the question "Why p?" will be the pair " ( e ,  explaining p)." 
3.3 Understanding 
An important point left open in the conditions for explaining is the meaning of the term "under- 
stand." Achinstein devotes a significant portion of his book to an often technical discussion of 
understanding, arriving at three conditions that define understanding. 
The first condition is simple: for an agent to  understand that e explains "why p," he must 
believe that e is a correct answer to the question. 
Second, one does not understand "why p" in isolation, but rather in a certain way. In fact, an 
agent may know an explanation for why p is the case, but ask "Why p?" to  learn an explanation 
of another sort. Thus, understanding an explanation includes the recognition that e provides a 
particular kind of answer to  "Why P ? . " ~  
The last condition for understanding is the most difficult. It is not sufficient to  know a proposi- 
tion that serves as an answer to  "Why p?," understanding also involves some notion of the relation 
between the answer and the question. For example, the classification of explanations in section 3.1 
presents many types of relations between e and p. Just as one can explain q by analogy with p, 
an agent can understand q by analogy with p. Thus, the final condition for understanding is that 
an appropriate relation exists between e and "why p." This relation is summarized in Achinstein7s 
notion of a content-giving proposition, a proposition that can be used with respect to "why p." 
3.4 Contrast Classes 
When Willy Sutton was in prison, a priest who was trying to reform him asked him why 
he robbed banks. ('Well," Sutton replied, '(that's where the money is." [13, p. 211 
A further requirement for explanation has been noted by Garfinkel [13] and van Fraassen [37]. 
They observe that p, the event or situation being explained, is always distinguished from some set 
of alternatives, which they call p's contrast class. Van Fraassen claims this contrast class is an 
implicit part of any why-question. For example, in the anecdote above, the question "Why do you 
rob banks" could have several contrast classes, such as 
Why do you rob banks? (That's where the money is.) 
Why do you rob  banks? (I don't like to work.) 
Why do you rob banks? (Because my wife won't.) 
and so on. The contrast class may be explicitly stated in a why-question, but i t  is usually implied 
by the context of the question and the current focus of the conversation. In either case, the question 
"Why p?" has an associated contrast class integral to the question. Thus, the task of explaining 
consists not simply of selecting an answer t o  present, but in selecting an answer from the correct 
contrast class, while denying that other members of the contrast class are a correct answer to the 
question. 
4Achinstein formalizes this point by introducing the notion of instructions as constraints on an explanation-any 
explanation for "why p" must also satisfy some set of instructions I. 
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This notion of a contrast class is lacking in most current expert systems. Systems that explain 
by reciting the history of what rules where used do not keep track of alternatives, thus, they cannot 
argue why one sequence of rules was followed instead of another. However, Swartout's XPLAIN 
[34] and EES systems [35] do address this issue to  some degree, in that the alternative methods for 
reaching a solution are recorded, allowing explanations of why one method was used rather than 
another. 
3.5 Explaining and Justifying 
Achinstein, Garfinkel, and van Fraassen are concerned only with characterizing scientific expla- 
nation, while the range of expert system explanations is not so limited. Thus, it is appropriate 
to  distinguish two related activities that up to now have been lumped together under the term 
"explaining." Explaining will be used in the sense defined by Achinstein: having the intention to 
produce knowledge in the hearer. On the other hand, justifying is weaker than explaining, only 
intending to  affect the beliefs of the hearer. Explanations and justifications are the result of explain- 
ing and justifying acts, respectively. Explanation deal with things that are true, while justifications 
are concerned with things that may not be true. 
Fortunately, Achinstein's conditions for explanation can be applied to  justifications as well, by 
relaxing the understandablity and correctness requirements. When explaining, S believes that he 
is giving a correct answer t o  "Why p?," while in justifying, S only believes his answer supports or is 
evidence for "why p." Likewise, in explaining, S intends H to know "why p," while in justifying S 
only intends that H accept e as support for why p. Formally, the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for performing a justifying act are the following. 
1. Intentionality: S utters u with the intention that H accept e as support for "why p." 
2. Correctness: S believes that e supports "why p." 
3. Instrumentality: S utters u with the intention that e be accepted as support for "why p" by 
H .  
In summary, explanation must be understood as the product of the illocutionary act of ex- 
plaining. An explanation answers a why question, whether the question is explicit or implicit. In 
explaining, the speaker believes his statement answers the question "why p" (the question being 
explained), and intends that the hearer understand "why p" through his statement. Moreover, 
the question "why p?" must be considered in the context in which it is asked. An explanation 
answers a why question with respect to  the space of possibilities associated (usually implicitly) with 
the question. In practical situations, a user model will be useful in producing an explanation by 
helping a system to  determine what question the user is asking (or might ask), and what range of 
possibilities he considers to be potential answers. 
4 What Makes an Explanation Good? 
Characterizing explanations and explaining is not sufficient to  enable one to  begin building expla- 
nation facilities for expert systems. Although precise conditions for explaining have been presented, 
the space of possible explanations satisfying those conditions for any given question may still be 
quite large. An explanation generator must consider how to chose among the valid explanations 
possible, hence it requires some way of determining the quality of those explanations. 
4 WHAT MAKES AN EXPLANATION GOOD? 9 
Just as section 3 examined the characteristics of (and conditions for being) an explanation, 
here, the features of good explanations are analyzed. Unfortunately, Achinstein resorts t o  vague 
terms such as "interesting" and "valuable" t o  characterize good explanations, terms that are as 
hard to  characterize as "good." Thus, our discussion of explanation quality must go beyond Achin- 
stein's treatment to  identify specific characteristics of explanation quality that can be used to  guide 
explanation generation. 
A starting point for this analysis is Austin's communicative acts. In section 3, explaining was 
described as an illocutionary action-solely in terms of the speaker's intent. This characterization 
was necessary to  account for the fact that explanations may vary in quality. When considering 
an explanation's quality, however, the expected perlocutionary effect of the explanation must be 
considered as well. This does not mean that the quality of an explanation depends on its actual 
success-an explanation can still be considered good, even if the hearer does not attend to  it. 
Rather, the quality of an explanation should depend on how successful the explanation is expected 
to  be, given its context. 
This section presents three criteria for evaluating the quality of an explanation. Two (relevancy, 
and convincingness) affect the content of the explanation, while the third (understanding) primarily 
affects how that content is communicated. 
4.1 Relevant Explanations 
The first requirement of a good explanation is that it be relevant to the hearer's needs. To some 
degree this is covered by the requirements of explanation itself: to explain "why p?" the speaker 
must respond with respect to the implicit contrast class of the question. Thus, a question that 
expects an intentional answer cannot be explained by a causal answer. However, the relevance of a 
response goes beyond simply answering the question. Often agents have higher goals they wish to  
accomplish, obtaining a particular explanation may be a small step in achieving those goals. An 
explanation will be more relevant if it addresses the hearer's higher goals in addition to  answering 
the immediate question. 
Satisfying the user's goals is at the root of Achinstein's inclusion of "interest" and "value" as 
requirements for good explanation. An explanation is interesting if it addresses the user's goals in 
seeking the explanation, and valuable if it contributes to  the accomplishment of those goals. 
Producing relevant explanations is one aspect of cooperative behavior, described by Grice in 
his maxims of cooperativity [14]. Grice7s maxims have been used extensively to guide research in 
the generation of cooperative responses, particularly in question answering systems. Two of these 
maxims have bearing on the relevance of explanations. The first, the maxim of relation, simply 
states "be relevant." This maxim summarizes the point made in this section, a relevant explanation 
is one that addresses the hearer's current goals. The second maxim, the maxim of quantity, goes 
a step further. The maxim of quantity says "Make your contribution as informative as necessary, 
but not more so." This maxim expresses the requirement that not only should a good explanation 
be relevant to the hearer's goals, it should address those goals as fully as possible. Furthermore, 
a good explanation will not include extraneous, irrelevant information that might be confusing to  
the hearer. 
The relevancy criteria for good explanation affects the content of the explanation: what in- 
formation is actually intended to be understood by the hearer after hearing the explanation. For 
an expert system, much of this information selection depends on the perceived goals of the user. 
This provides a partial method of evaluating the quality of explanations, in that one explanation is 
better than another if it enables the user to  accomplish his task more quickly or with less effort. In 
producing good explanations, therefore, an expert system must attempt to maximize the likelihood 
4 WHAT MAKES AN EXPLANATION GOOD? 
that the explanation it gives will satisfy the goals of the user. 
4.2 Convincing Justifications 
A justification presents an argument for belief, but the hearer may refuse to accept that argument. 
Thus, not only must good justifications be relevant and understandable, they should convince the 
user to believe what is being justified. 
The convincingness of a justification depends on two things: the soundness of the justification 
itself, and the extent to  which the hearer finds the justification acceptable. The soundness criterion 
affects the argument itself: a deductive argument is stronger than an inductive one, highly certain 
inferences are better than questionable ones, and scientific justifications are better than analogies 
or examples. In addition, for an argument to be convincing, the hearer must accept its premises 
and reasoning steps. Thus, it is better to argue based on facts the hearer believes, rather than 
facts the hearer is uncertain about, or does not believe at all. Likewise, a particular hearer may 
consider analogies to be perfectly acceptable arguments, meaning that an analogy from strong 
premises could be a more convincing justification for that hearer than a deductive argument from 
weak premises. 
The convincingness criteria also affects the content of an explanation, since it helps determine 
what form of explanation to give, and what facts or arguments to include in that explanation. 
4.3 Understandable Explanations 
Not only must an explanation be relevant to the user, he must find it understandable. As with 
relevance, in order to produce good explanations, an expert system must strive to  maximize the 
likelihood that the user indeed understands the explanation. Five features affect the understand- 
ability of an explanation: the first four (appropriateness, economy, organization, and familiarity) 
are concerned wih features of the explanation itself, while the fifth (processing requirements) con- 
siders understandability in terms of the effort on the part of the hearer. In fact, the processing 
required of a hearer to  understand an explanation seems to be a primary criteria for judging the 
understandability of an explanation. 
Appropriateness To be understood, a speaker must select a type of explanation the hearer is 
likely to understand. For example, in explaining how a light switch controls a light, one might give 
a physical-causal explanation, an analogy to water flow, or simply describe a sequence of events; 
depending on the knowledge the listener had of electricity. Paris, in studying the types of descrip- 
tions given by encyclopedias for children versus those for adults [26], discovered that significantly 
different forms of explanation are used for persons with different degrees of knowledge: for novices 
the explanations tend to  be process-oriented, while for knowledgeable persons the explanations will 
tend to describe an object in terms of its properties, its parts, and things it is a part of. Thus, the 
kind of explanation appropriate for a user is dependent on his level of knowledge. 
Economy Webber and Joshi [40] state that justifications from a knowledge base should be suc- 
cinct. A succinct justification (or explanation) is one that does not provide more information than 
is necessary, and that provides this information with a minimum of words. Thus, with other things 
being equal, a short explanation is better than a long one. 
Organization The organization of an explanation also affects its understandability: simple ex- 
planations are more likely to  be understood than complex ones, and explanations that highlight 
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points of interest to  the user will be more successful. Weiner [41] identified several organizational 
features affecting the complexity of an explanation, including: the amount the of detail used, the 
grouping of information, and the presence of structural information in the explanation. These 
issues have also been addressed by McKeown in organizing output in the TEXT system [20]. A 
well-organized explanation avoids large amounts of detail, collects related information together, 
and gives clues to help the user understand its structure. 
Familiarity Another issue is the familiarity to the hearer of the content of the explanation. An 
explanation is more likely to be understood if it is expressed using terms the hearer is familiar with. 
Familiarity also affects the succinctness and complexity of an explanation, because unfamiliar terms 
or concepts will need to  be explained for the hearer to understand the explanation. Thus, the use 
of unfamiliar terms in an explanation causes an explanation to be longer and more complex. On 
the other hand, if the hearer is familiar with portions of an explanation, they can be omitted. This 
happens frequently in logical deduction explanations, where reasoning steps are left out because 
the hearer is presumed to know them, and how they apply to the explanation. 
Processing Requi rements  An issue that encompasses the features described above is the pro- 
cessing requimd on the part of the hearer to understand an explanation. These processing require- 
ments can be divided into two categories: the amount of work the hearer must do to comprehend 
the explanation itself, and the amount of work required to infer the information the speaker in- 
tended to communicate by the e~p lana t ion .~  The issues of economy, organization, and familiarity 
affect the processing required of the hearer by determining the relative amount of work the hearer 
must do to comprehend the explaining statement, versus the work to infer the speaker's intended 
information. For example, an explanation may be well-structured and succinct, requiring very little 
work for the hearer to comprehend it, but the explanation may be indirect, causing the hearer to 
make further inferences to understand what the speaker was trying to communicate. 
Processing requirements are important feature of explanation because they provide a single 
measure for understandability of explanations: explanations that require more processing to un- 
derstand are more prone to be misunderstood. Thus, an expert system should seek to  minimize 
the anticipated processing requirements of the user. Such a measure is attractive because it cap- 
tures the intuition that a complete explanation, even though it is cooperative and correct, is not 
necessarily better than a short explanation that still addresses the user's goals. 
To produce a good explanation or justification, issues of cooperativity, argumentation, and 
understandability must be addressed. The response must address the user's goals and preferences, 
be argued convincingly, and expressed in a manner that is likely to communicate the intended 
information. As discussed in the next section, explanation capabilities in each of these areas can be 
enhanced by the use of knowledge about the user. Section 6 will discuss techniques for acquiring 
some of this knowledge, and the use of this knowledge to enhance to  determine the familiarity 
criteria of understandability is illustrated with examples in section 7. 
5 The Need for User Models in Generating Explanations 
Having explored the nature of explanation and good explanation, this section will argue that user 
models are needed to produce good explanations, and indicate how knowledge about the user can 
5Ringle and Bruce [30] draw this distinction in their discussion of conversation failure. They call a failure to  
comprehend what is said an input failure, while a failure to  assimulate the intended meaning of the statement is a 
model failure. 
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be used to improve explanations according to the criteria presented in section 4. First, however, a 
definition for the term "user model" is needed. 
5.1 User Models 
Providing a precise definition of what constitutes a user model is not easy to do. As a basis for 
discussion, we will adopt a definition proposed by Wahlster and Kobsa [38] that states: 
A user model is a knowledge source in a natural-language dialog system which contains 
explicit assumptions on all aspects of the user that may be relevant for the dialog 
behavior of the system. 
The knowledge a user model keeps about a user may be quite varied, including assumptions about 
the user's goals, plans, preferences and attitudes, capabilities, and knowledge or beliefs [la]. User 
models also vary in their generality: a system might maintain individualized models for every user 
it encounters, with specific assumptions about each user's goals, preferences, beliefs, and so on; or 
the system might keep a generic user model that it applies to all users of the system. Generic user 
models often are not explicitly represented, but implicit in the design of the system as a whole. In 
fact, any system that interacts with the user can be said to have an implicit user model, if only by 
virtue of the assumptions the system builder made about the user while designing the system. 
5.2 Why User Models are Needed 
The discussion in sections 3 and 4 has provided a basis for understanding the role of user models 
in generating explanations. User models are not needed to generate explanations per se, since 
explaining is simply an illocutionary act-it is possible to provide an explanation without consid- 
ering the hearer at all. However, to produce a good explanation the speaker must consider the 
likely perlocutionary effect of the explanation on the hearer: will the explanation be relevant to 
the hearer's goals?, is it likely to convince him of the point being justified?, and is he likely to 
understand it? To answer these questions, the speaker must reason about the hearer beliefs, goals, 
plans, and preferences. 
Still, an expert system explanation component may not require an explicit user model to produce 
good explanations. If the anticipated class of system users is homogeneous in the beliefs and 
intentions of its members, an explanation component can be designed to produce good explanations 
for this class of individuals. 
Frequently, though, the anticipated system users will vary in their knowledge and goals. For 
example, intelligent help systems, intelligent tutoring systems, or domains such as investment 
advising will have users who vary greatly in their knowledge of the system domain. In this case, 
to produce good explanations for all users, the explanation component will need to tailor the 
explanations it produces-based on the model it has of the user's beliefs, goals, and plans. Thus, 
to produce good explanations for a range of users requires an explanation component to make use 
of explicit user models. 
To produce a relevant explanation, the explanation component must have knowledge of the 
user's goals and preferences. Not only must the system know the user's immediate goals, but also 
his higher goals and preferences, and his intended plan for accomplishing those goals. A relevant 
explanation may need to provide information to help a user achieve a higher goal or goals, or to 
correct the user's plan when it is faulty. Much work has been done in this area to identify what 
information about the user's plans and goals are needed, and how that information can be used to 
produce cooperative responses relevant to the user's situation [2, 27, 61. 
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The convincingness of a justification depends on the soundness of the argument presented, and 
the likelihood that the user will accept the justification. The soundness of the argument itself is 
independent of the user, but whether he will accept the argument is another matter. To produce a 
convincing justification, then, the system must consider whether the user believes the premises of 
the justification, and whether he considers the inferences made (or even the form of argument) valid. 
Thus, a robust model of the user's beliefs will be needed to help generate acceptable justifications. 
Producing an explanation that the user will find understandable also requires knowledge of the 
user's beliefs about the domain. Here the user model is needed primarily to determine the familiarity 
of the user with the system domain. In this case, the explanation component needs to know the 
concepts and properties the user knows about, the terms he understands, and the relationships 
between entities, such as the relationship between reasoning steps that the user performs. 
A deeper model of the user may also be required to estimate the user's ability to  process 
the information communicated in the explanation. A psychological model of the user's ability to 
make inferences from the system's statements, or to fill in omitted reasoning steps can be useful 
in determining how to organize an explanation and in deciding how much information to  include 
explicitly. 
In summary, individualized models of the user are important, even necessary, to generate good 
explanations when system users vary in their goals and domain knowledge. In the remainder of 
this paper we will illustrate how a user model may be used when tailoring explanations in an 
investment advisory system. Section 6 presents work we have done on acquiring models of users' 
beliefs. Section 7 illustrates how such models can be acquired from a user-system dialog, and how 
the information about user beliefs acquired in this way enables an explanation component to tailor 
its explanations to individual users so they are more understandable. 
6 Acquiring User Beliefs for Explaining 
Using a detailed model of users' beliefs to support the generation of expert system explanations 
has previously appeared impractical, due to the difficulty in acquiring such a model. Techniques 
that emphasize explicit pre-encoding of user models (such as stereotypes [29]) are tedious, error- 
prone, and may potentially require more time to build than the domain knowledge base itself, 
due to the number of separate models necessary. On the other hand, acquiring the information 
from the user, either explicitly or implicitly, has not seemed feasible. Explicitly asking the user 
about his knowledge of the domain (as in the UMFE system [33]) can be very time consuming and 
potentially fraught with error due to the user's own misconceptions about what he knows, while 
implicit acquisition techniques have been viewed as either too slow to build a robust model or too 
unreliable in the conclusions they make. 
Our current research [16, 191 indicates that this user model acquisition bottleneck can be over- 
come. The solution centers on a set of implicit acquisition rules that make reasonable inferences 
about a user's beliefs, based on the interaction between the system and the user, the system's 
knowledge base, and the existing model of the user. These rules were developed after study of an 
extensive collection of transcripts of conversations between advice-seekers and a human expert,6 
and have been implemented in the General User Model Acquisition Component, or GUMAC. 
'The transcripts were made by Martha Pollack and Julia Hirschberg from the radio talk show "Harry Gross: 
Speaking about Your Money" broadcast on station WCAU in Philadelphia, February 1-5, 1982. 




User Modelling Module 
Figure 1: Sources of Knowledge for Implicit User Model Acquisition 
6.1 The GUMAC System 
GUMAC works in a cooperative advisory situation, where a user comes to  the system seeking advice 
about a problem, and both the user and the system cooperate in solving that problem. Figure 1 
illustrates the role GUMAC plays in an interactive system. The user interacts with an underlying 
application (the advisory expert system) through a user interface. The user modelling module (of 
which GUMAC is the model acquisition component) has access to the interface and the domain 
knowledge base and uses these to  build the user model. GUMAC has been implemented in the 
context of an investment advising system, but the acquisition techniques are not limited to  this 
domain. In fact, the rules make no assumptions about the domain knowledge, but instead depend 
on the type of interaction, i.e. a cooperative advisory interaction. The domain independence of 
these rules lends support to the feasibility of building a general user modelling system, as proposed 
by Finin [12]. 
The interface is assumed to  have a natural language parser and semantic interpreter that produce 
an intermediate meaning representation language (MRL). In our implementation this component 
has been simulated by hand-translating English sentences into a LUNAR-style MRL [42].7 GUMAC 
uses this intermediate representation as the basis for its reasoning about statements made by both 
the user and the system. 
The user models built by GUMAC can be viewed as individual knowledge bases containing each 
user's beliefs. These user models may be queried by other components of the system, such as the 
application or the interface, to obtain yes/no answers about individual user's  belief^.^ GUMAC 
7We are making no special assumptions about the capability of the parser and semantic interpreter beyond the 
capabilities of current systems. The parser and semantic interpreter are not actually present in our test system 
because of the implementation time required. 
'This is the simplest use for the user model. More sophisticated uses for user models, such as using the model 
to simulate the user, are possible and have been explored (See, for example, Wahlster and Kobsa's discussion of 
anticipation feedback loops in generating anaphoric responses [38].) Likewise, the responses given to queries about 
user beliefs can be more sophisticated as well, providing degree of belief measures or justifications for the beliefs held 
in the user model, instead of a simple yes/no answer. 





(ROLE market (VR stock-market)) 
(ROLE own (VR corporation)) 
(ROLE issuer (VR corporation)) 
(ROLE par-value (VR dollar-amount)) 
(ROLE dividend (VR quant-val-measure))) 
Figure 2: A NIKL definition for the concept of stock. The "specializes" clauses express the fact 
that a stock is a kind of equity, market-traded-security, and a corporate-security; anything true of 
these concepts is true of stock as well. "VR" stands for the value restriction of a role. 
is designed to  acquire knowledge of what the user knows about the system's domain knowledge. 
Thus, the user models built by GUMAC can be thought of as overlay models [7], in that entities 
(such as concepts, properties, or actions) in the user model will always be a subset of those in the 
domain model of the application system. However, the user models GUMAC builds can represent 
different relations between these entities, so the user models are not strictly subsets of the domain 
model. 
The domain knowledge is represented using EES, the Explanable Expert System [24], and 
consists of two types: definitional knowledge about the entities in the domain, and strategic (or 
reasoning) knowledge about how to solve problems in the domain. The definitional knowledge is 
represented in NIKL [23], a semantic network similar to the taxonomic component of KL-ONE 
[4]. NIKL has two types of entities: concepts (such as stock or equity), which can be expressed as 
l-place predicates in a first-order logic, and roles representing relations between concepts (such as 
owner or interest-rate), which can be expressed as two place predicates. An example of a NIKL 
definition for the stock concept is illustrated in figure 2. GUMAC makes user model assertions 
about the user's knowledge of concepts, roles, whether roles apply to  particular concepts, and the 
specialization relations between concepts. 
The strategic knowledge in EES is represented using a goal and plan hierarchy. A plan consists 
of a capability description of the action it can accomplish and a method consisting of a sequence of 
steps to  be performed to  accomplish the capability description. To build an expert system in EES, 
the system designer writes a set of plans, provides a top level goal to be accomplished, then invokes 
an automatic program writer. The program writer examines the top level goal, finds plans capable 
of accomplishing this goal, selects one, instantiates it, then posts the steps in the plans's method 
as subgoals and recursively tries to  find plans t o  accomplish them. The result of this process is 
a goal refinement structure representing the system's reasoning method to  achieve the top level 
goal. GUMAC makes assertions to the user model about the user's beliefs about the goal-subgoal 
relations between actions in this hierarchy and the user's knowledge of the actions themselves. 
6.2 The Acquisition Rules 
Implicit acquisition of user models is feasible because of the structure of human communication 
and reasoning. The fact that a particular type of conversation is being held provides constraints 
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on the expected behavior of the conversation participants that can serve as a basis for inferring an 
individual's beliefs during the conversation. Likewise, the fact that an individual is human creates 
expectations about how he reasons and, thus, the beliefs he holds. 
The acquisition rules are reasonable inference rules, but they can make mistakes. The goal is 
not t o  produce certain knowledge about the user, but rather the assumptions that a reasonable 
conversational participant would make about the user in the same situation. Thus, the acquisition 
rules can be viewed as default rules in a default logic [28]: they draw conclusions that are reasonable 
t o  believe unless information to  the contrary is encountered. 
One important set of user model acquistion rules are the communication rules, based on Grice's 
maxims for cooperative communication [14]. Grice has proposed these maxims as a way of describ- 
ing the behavior of cooperative conversational participants. By assuming that users are cooperating 
with the system: the communication rules make inferences about user beliefs based on these max- 
ims. 
Direct Statement Rule The direct statement rule is based on the maxim of quality ("Only say 
that which you believe to be true"), and can be expressed as: 
coop-agent(User) A tell(User, System, P) - believe(User, P). 
Here, P will be a logical form expressing the content of the user's statement in the intermediate 
MRL. In itself this is not too useful, so the expression is decomposed into a set of assertions 
about the user's beliefs about domain concepts, roles, and their relations. Figure 3 illustrates a 
sample user statement and the associated MRL for that statement. The "saying" portion of this 
MRL expression will be asserted as a user belief, along with a list of assertions about the user's 
knowledge of domain entities, some of which are illustrated in figure 4. Note that an assertion 
such as "bel(U, concept(T-Bill))" does not mean the user knows all about T-Bills, only that he has 
some knowledge of the concept. Other assertions, such as "bel(User, role(T-Bill, interest-rate))," 
are necessary to  indicate the aspects of U's knowledge of T-Bills. 
Relevancy Rule The relevancy rule, based on Grice's maxim of relation, draws conclusions 
about the user's beliefs about the strategic knowledge of the domain. This rule presumes that since 
the user is cooperating, his contributions will be relevant to  the current conversational goal. In 
terms of the EES representation, this means the user believes his action is a step (or subgoal) in 
achieving the system's current goal. The relevancy rule can be expressed as follows: 
coop-agent(User) A tell(User, System, P)  A current-goal(System, G) - 
bel(User, subgoal(tell(User, System, P), G)). 
In practice, the system's current goal is easy to determine from the goal refinement structure 
produced by the EES automatic program writer. Furthermore, this goal can be assumed to be a 
mutual belief held by the user and system, since the system will explicitly state its goal by asking a 
question, such as "what is your yearly income?"10 The relevancy rule provides an example of how 
the acquisition rules can make conclusions that are not strictly a subset of the system's domain 
model. For example, if the current goal is to  determine the user's yearly income, and the user 
provides information about his property tax payments, the relevancy rule will conclude that the 
user believes property tax information is needed to  determine income, when the system knows it is 
not. 
'This is a reasonable assumption, since the user has come to the system to receive advice. 
''In fact, another acquisition rule concludes that if the system asks a question, then the user believes that the goal 
associated with that question is the current goal. 
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User: "I have a $10,000 T-Bill at 7-112% interest." 
(FOR THE t l  / tell 
: (speaker t l  User) 
: (addressee t l  System) 
: (saying t l  
(FOR THE t b l  / treasury-bill 
: (interest-rate t b l  
(FOR THE pct l  / percentage 
: (measurement-unit pct l  number) 
: (value pct l  7.5))) 
: (face-value t b l  
(FOR THE d l  / dollar-amount 
: (measurement-unit d l  dollar) 
: (value d l  10000))) 
; (owned-by t b l  User))))) 
Figure 3: A User Statement and Associated MRL 
bel(User, concept(interest-rate) 
bel(User , concept (face-value) 
bel(User, concept(interest-rate-domain) 
bel(User , concept (face-value-domain) 
bel(User , concept (percentage) 
bel(User, concept (dollar) 
bel(User, concept(treasury-bill) 






bel(User, concept (face-value-range) 
bel(User, isa(treasury-bill, interest-rate-domain) 
bel(User, isa(treasury-bill, face-value-domain) 
Figure 4: Assertions Made by the Direct Statement Rule 
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Sufficiency Rule A third communication rule, the sufficiency rule, is based on the maxim of 
quantity, which states "make your contribution as informative as necessary, but not more SO.)) The 
sufficiency rule deals with the situation where the system knows that a certain action must be 
performed by the user to  accomplish the current goal, but the user fails to perform that action. 
In this case, there are several possibilities: (1) the user doesn't know that current goal, (2) the 
user doesn't believe the action is relevant to  the goal, (3) the user believes the system can achieve 
the goal without the action being performed, or (4) the user does not believe he can perform the 
action. This can expressed as follows: 
Other Rules Other implicit acquisition rules reason on the knowledge base and the current user 
model. Such rules include transitivity rules for goals and concepts, the inheritance rule, and a 
generalization rule for concepts: 
bel(User, isa(A, B)) A bel(User, isa(B, C)) --+ bel(User, isa(A, C)) 
bel(User, subgoal(G1, G2)) A bel(User, subgoal(G2, G3)) + bel(User, subgoal(G1, G3)) 
bel(User, isa(A, B)) A bel(User, role(B, R)) + bel(User, role(A, R)) 
bel(User , concep t(A) A bel(User, concept(B)) A bel(User, concept (C)) A 
bel(System, concept(D)) A bel(System, isa(A, D)) A 
bel(System, isa(B, D)) A bel(System, isa(C, D)) - 
bel(User, concept (D) A bel(User, isa(A, D)) A 
bel(User, isa(B, D)) A bel(User, isa(C, D)). 
A similar generalization rule exists for goals, but is difficult to express in a simple logical notation. 
Essentially, if the user knows all the plan steps where he is an agent, then the goal generalization 
rule will conclude that the user knows the goal the plan is capable of achieving. 
During the course of a user-system dialog, these user model acquisition rules make a large 
number of assertions about the user's beliefs about the system's domain. At the end of this dialog, 
GUMAC has built a robust model of the user's domain knowledge with respect to  the topics 
discussed in the dialog. This model will contain few assertions of user's beliefs beyond the discourse 
topics of the dialog, but the model built is sufficient to support the tailoring of explanations to  
individual users. Examples of how a model is built by the acquisition rules and used t o  tailor 
explanations are presented in the next section. 
7 An Extended Example 
This section illustrates how a user model may be acquired from an on-going dialogue, and how 
that model can be used to  tailor explanations so they are more understandable. To this end, the 
interaction of two users with an investment advisory system is presented. Each user has the same 
goal for using the system, and is in the same financial situation, so the system's recommendation will 
be the same in each case, and for the same reasons. The users differ, however, in their knowledge 
about the investment domain. These differences are evident in the way they interact with the 
system, causing the acquisition rules to construct different models for each user, and suggesting 
that the explanations given to each user should differ. 
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Goal: recommend(Systeni, User, invest(User, Security)) 
Method: 1) determine(System, acceptable-risk(User)) ---t AR 
2) determine(System, required-income(User)) --t RI 
3) determine(System, required-liquidity(User)) - RL 
4) choose-security(System, AR, RI, RL) - Sec 
5) tell(System, User, invest(User, Sec)) 
Figure 5: Recommend Investment Plan 
In this scenario, each user wants to  know how to invest $10,000 he now has in a savings account. 
The top level goal of the investment advisor (represented in EES) is for the system to recommend 
to  the user that he invest in a particular security, accomplished by the RECOMMEND-INVESTMENT 
plan, illustrated in figure 5. Much of the user-system interaction focuses on determining the user's 
income, obligations, and current investments in order to determine the user's income and liquidity 
requirements, and the degree of risk he can accept in his investments. The system then compares 
these constraints with its knowledge of potential investment securities to select the most appropriate 
security to recommend. 
A Knowledgeable User 
The first dialogue proceeds as follows: 
(1) U1: Could you recommend how I should invest $10,000 I have in my 
savings account? 
,// '
(2) S: What are your current investments? \\ I 
(3) U1: 1 have a $40,000 6-month CD $ 8% inter st, 
a $10,000 T-Bill a t  7$% interesb, 
$14,000 in a savings account, 
J 
200 shares of AT&T which I bought at 32, 
and $1000 in checking. 
(4) S: What is your yearly income? 
(5) U1: I earn $35,000 and my wife makes $15,000, plus we get $5000 from 
our investments. 
(6) S: What obligations do you have? 
(7) U1: I pay $300 on a car loan and $900 on my home loan. 
(8) I have no dependents. 
At this point the system has sufficient information to  make the recommendation that the user 
should invest in growth stocks.ll Furthermore, the model acquisition rules have built a substantial 
model of the user's beliefs about investing, portions of which are illustrated in figures 6 and 7. 
l l ~ h e  investment advisory system we are using has limited domain knowledge, so the interaction stops at  this 
point. A more robust system would probably require a longer dialogue in order to gather the necessary information 
to make a decision. We feel this would enhance the effectiveness of the user model acquisition component, since i t  
would have more information to work from. 
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Figure 6: A Model of Ul's Knowledge of Investment Securities 
Concepts and Roles U1 is believed to know are shown in gray, with an associated rule indicating 
why the user is believed to  know it. "DS" stands for the direct statement rule, while "CG" indicates 
the concept generalization rule was used. 
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Spouse  ? 
Marr ied 1 T b "' ' 1  
Figure 7: A Model of U17s Knowledge of Property Dependencies 
Properties U1 is believed to know are shown in gray. Associated with each property or relation U1 
is believed to know is the rule that asserted the conclusion. "DS" stands for the direct statement 
rule, "R" for the relevancy rule, and "Gen" for the goal generalization rule. 
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Goal: determine(System, yearly-income(User)) 
Method: 1) askref(System, User, yearly-income(User)) 
2) determine(System, employment-income(User)) - EI 
3) determine(System, retirement-income(User)) - RI 
4) determine(System, spouse's-income(User)) - SI 
5) determine(System, investment-income(User)) - I1 
6) add(System, EI, RI, SI, 11) - YI 
Figure 8: Determine Yearly Income Plan 
Figure 6 depicts a small portion of the definitional knowledge represented in the NIKL semantic 
network. In answering the system's questions U1 has made several direct statements about his 
financial situation. From these statements the direct statement infers that U1 believes what he has 
said, and thus knows about concepts such as SAVINGS-ACCOUNT and INTEREST-RATE. Building 
on these assertions, the concept generalization rule can infer Ul's knowledge of more abstract 
concepts, such as inferring Ul's knowledge of BANK-SECURITIES from his knowledge of SAVINGS- 
ACCOUNT, CHECKING-ACCOUNT, and CERTIFICATE-OF-DEPOSIT. Furthermore, the transitivity and 
inheritance rules have made a large number of inferences about concept properties and subsumption 
relations that are not explicitly depicted in the figure. 
Figure 7 illustrates a portion of the investment advisor's reasoning structure. In this domain, 
the system can be viewed as performing a series of actions to  determine information. This figure 
is a graph showing some of the pieces of information the system must determine. For example, 
to  determine the user's yearly income, the system needs to  determine the user's employment and 
retirement income, his spouse's income, and his income from current investments. In EES, this 
is represented as the six-step plan illustrated in figure 8. Only the plan steps that involve user 
action are illustrated in figure 7. In this dialogue, when U1 was asked about his yearly income and 
obligations, he provided a large amount of information that satisfied the subgoal requirements of the 
DETERMINE-YEARLY-INCOME and DETERMINE-OBLIGATIONS plans. The relevancy rule has made 
assertions reflecting this, since Ul's action of telling the system this information (such as telling the 
system his investment income) achieves the "determine" goals (such as DETERMINE-INVESTMENT- 
INCOME). These assertions indicate that the user knows how yearly-income and obligations are 
determined. Furthermore, this knowledge enables the goal generalization rule to  reason further 
that U1 knows how REQUIRED-INCOME, ACCEPTABLE-RISK, and so on are determined. 
After this dialogue, the system makes its recommendation "You should invest in growth stocks," 
to  which U1 may ask "Why?" This question may be answered in many ways, but for this example 
we will assume that a standard type of expert system explanation is given-a description of the 
steps the system took to  reach this conclusion. The user model that has been acquired is now useful 
in applying the familiarity criteria to determine what information to include in the explanation. 
To be successful, an explanation should be grounded in the user's own knowledge of the domain, a 
requirement that affects how deeply the explanation must delve into the system's goal refinement 
structure before reaching actions and terms the user knows. In fact, if the explanation component 
assumes the user has no knowledge of the domain beyond that directly evidenced in his statements, 
the explanation may include the majority of this refinement structure. 
From the dialogue the relevancy and goal generalization rules have inferred that the user knows 
a lot about the system's reasoning, so a large portion of the refinement structure can be omitted 
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from the explanation. In fact, starting from the top level RECOMMEND-INVESTMENT plan presented 
in figure 5, the system does not need to explain how it determined REQUIRED-INCOME, REQUIRED- 
LIQUIDITY, and ACCEPTABLE-RISK because the user model indicates that U1 knows this already. 
Thus, the explanation only needs to concentrate on the CHOOSE-SECURITY step. Following is an 
example of the type of explanation the system could produce for U1: 
S: To recommend an investment, I choose a security that maximizes return on investment, 
while satisfying your income, liquidity, and risk needs. Since you can accept high risk, debt 
securities (such as bank securities or government-issued securities like T-Bills) are ruled out, 
so you should invest in an equity. Real estate is not appreciating well presently, so stock 
would be a good investment. Since you can accept a fair amount of risk, I recommend stock 
with a high potential for return, such as stock in growth-oriented companies. 
In addition to deciding how much explanation to give, the system must consider how to express that 
information; the user model can help here as well. Notice that in the explanation above the term 
"debt security" is introduced with examples of types of debt securities. The user model contains 
no assertions that the user knows what a debt security is, so the explanation generator tries to 
introduce the term with respect to concepts that the user model indicates he does know about, 
such as bank securities. That is not sufficient, so it also says that government securities are types 
of debt securities, giving a partial definition for this term and an example of a government security 
that the user knows about. 
Although an explanation generation component is not included in the GUMAC implementation, 
the capabilities assumed are not unreasonable. Weiner's BLAH system [41] used a similar approach 
to generate explanations, using a user model to decide what reasoning steps to include. Moore and 
Paris [22] are currently implementing a plan-based explanation generator for the EES system that 
reasons about the user's knowledge state to control the generation process. It should require little 
work to  integrate GUMAC with their system. 
A Novice User 
The dialogue with a novice investor is significantly different. Where the knowledgeable user volun- 
teered relevant information when a question was asked, the novice does not know what information 
is relevant (or does not know the information at all), hence, the system must ask further questions 
to  elicit this information from him. For example, where U1 volunteered information about his wife's 
income and dependents, in the following conversation the system must ask several questions to get 
this information from U2. 
(9) S: What is your yearly income? 
(10) U2: I earn $35,000. 
(11) S: Are you married? 
(12) U2: Yes. 
(13) S: Does your spouse work? 
(14) U2: Yes. 
(15) S: What is her income? 
(16) U2: She makes $15,000. 
(17) S: Do you have any dependents? 
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Figure 9: A Model of U2's Knowledge of Property Dependencies 
Properties U2 is believed to  know are shown in gray. Properties and relations U2 is believed to  
not know are shown with hatching. Associated with each property or relation U2 is believed to  
know is the rule that asserted the conclusion. "DS" stands for the direct statement rule, "R" for 
the relevancy rule, and "S" for the sufficiency rule. 
(18) U2: No. 
(19) S: Are you making any loan payments? 
(20) U2: I pay $300 on a car loan and $900 on my home loan. 
The portion of the user model built for U2, illustrated in figure 9, together with the comparable 
model for U1 in figure 7 indicates the significant differences between the models built for each user. 
An explanation for U2 will require much more detail. To explain the rationale for its recom- 
mendation, the system will need to give a detailed account of how it determined the user's income, 
liquidity, and risk requirements, in addition to  explaining how it chose to  recommend growth stocks. 
In fact, the explanation would be most effective if given in pieces, so that the system could check 
that the user understands what has been said at  each step. An example of one portion of an 
explanation for U2, concerning his income needs, is illustrated below. 
S: Since you don't have substantial loans, and you have no dependents, you don't have many 
financial obligations to  meet (things you will need to  pay for). Furthermore, your yearly in- 
come from your job and your wife's, and from your current investments is more than sufficient 
to meet those obligations, so your future investments don't need to produce regular income 
(such as interest payments). 
Here, to explain how REQUIRED-INCOME was determined, the system first explains how OBLIGA- 




A model of a user's knowledge and beliefs can significantly affect the explanations generated by 
an expert system. In the previous example, users at two extremes of knowledge about the domain 
were chosen to  illustrate the types of explanations that might be generated if knowledge about 
the user is available. How does this compare t o  systems that have a fixed method for generating 
explanations (or a fixed set of assumptions about the user)? Such systems always generate the 
same explanation regardless of the user. If the system assumed that all users are knowledgeable 
about investments, then U2 would receive an explanation similar to that generated for U1  in the 
example. Such a terse explanation, using terms U2 did not understand and omitting reasoning 
steps necessary for him to follow the justification would not be understandable. 
On the other hand, if the system assumed all users were novices, then U1  would receive an 
explanation similar to that given to  U2. In this case, U1  would probably understand the explanation 
(although the length of the explanation might cause U1 to  skip the explanation or only read portions 
of it), but the same understanding could be achieved with a much simpler explanation. In this case, 
the explanation given U1  fails to be good because it is too long and complex. 
In most situations, actual users will fall somewhere between the extremes used in this example 
(although the descriptions of the knowledge of U1  and U2 are reasonable). Yet, even if the system 
chooses a generic model for some "average" user, if there is significant variability among users 
(which is the case for many domains, such as investment advising), then explanations based on 
this generic model of the user will frequently fail to  be as good as they could be. Thus, a model 
of the user's beliefs is an important component to generating good explanations, and the implicit 
acquisition technique we have presented makes it practical to  include such models in an expert 
system. 
8 Conclusions 
An explanation facility is an important component of an expert system, perhaps the most important 
component. Thus, the quality of a system's explanations will significantly affect its acceptability 
and effectiveness. This paper has explored the nature of explanation, the components of a good 
explanation, and argued that frequently systems will need to  tailor explanations to  individual users 
and thus need a model of those users' beliefs. Furthermore, it is practical to  acquire such user 
model implicitly, a method that greatly reduces the effort required to incorporate user models into 
explanation systems. 
The user model acquisition method described in this paper has been purposely restricted to  only 
implicit techniques to  demonstrate the power and feasibility of such an approach. This approach 
is probably too extreme for practical systems, however. In the GUMAC system, no explicitly 
acquired information is kept about the user-when a new user is encountered, the model describing 
his beliefs is a blank slate. For a practical system a combination of implicit and explicit acquisition 
would be more effective. If the user model is to be used to  help determine system behavior during 
the dialogue, an initial, explicitly acquired model would be useful t o  support the first portions of 
the conversation. Then, as the dialogue proceeds, the implicit acquisition rules will progressively 
refine this initial model to correspond to  the specific user. Such a method would still minimize 
the explicit acquisition required, since the initial model could be a generic model describing the 
"average" system user.'' 
12See [17] a discussion of how stereotypic user models can be integrated with implicit acquisition methods in a 
general user modelling system. 
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This work suggests several possible directions for studying the role of user modelling in expert 
system explanation. First, the classification of good explanation given in section 4 is just an initial 
attempt to  characterize an area that is not well understood. More work is needed to discover what 
makes an explanation good-this work will contribute greatly to the effectiveness of future expert 
systems. A study of the types of knowledge about the user needed for explanation generation 
is a second area for further research. Section 5 provided a general catagorization of these types, 
but to  actually generate good explanations, these categories must be defined in detail. A related 
research area is t o  study how an explanation facility uses a user model. This study could lead 
to  an understanding of what general services a user model should be expected to provide to  the 
system components that use it. A fourth, very important need is t o  develop a measure or measures 
of the quality of an explanation. Currently, two explanations cannot be objectively compared to 
determine which is better. Finally, the work on acquiring a user model described in section 6 is 
quite limited in the types of information it can acquire, and the types of interactions from which 
it can acquire that information. To extend the explanation capabilities of an expert system, user 
model acquisition capabilities must be extended as well. 
Expert system explanation and user modelling are both relatively new fields of study. This 
paper has demonstrated the importance of user modelling for explanation, and provides examples 
of how to acquire and use such information to  improve the understandability of explanations. 
Furthermore, this work suggests many areas for further research, research that should result in 
substantial improvements in the explanations produced by expert systems. 
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